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Abstract 
This paper formalizes a model for strategic negotiation by an automated agent in bilateral agent-
to-human multi-issue negotiations. Integrating insights from psychological and behavioral 
research, we hypothesize that compared to basic concession-based sequential-single offer and 
threshold-based immediate acceptance, a strategy based on simultaneous-equivalent offers and 
delayed acceptance makes a significant positive impact on both the economic and social-
psychological outcomes of negotiations. We tested these hypotheses using a 2x2 experimental 
study conducted with 110 industrial subjects who negotiated with an automated agent on a 4-issue 
business purchase task. MANCOVA results suggested that compared to a baseline condition when 
the agent did not employ the proposed strategy, settlement efficiency and buyer’s subjective 
responses were significantly higher when the seller agent provided simultaneous-equivalent offers, 
while the distance to Nash solution was significantly enhanced when the agent employed strategic 
acceptance delay. The findings confirmed the effectiveness of the proposed strategy and validated 
the efficacy of a novel implementation of an automated negotiation agent artifact.    
 
Keywords:  Automated negotiation, software agents, e-business & e-markets, negotiation strategy, multi-
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cooperativeness, win-win negotiation 
 
Global Information and Communication Technologies & E-business 
2     Thirtieth International Conference on Information Systems, Phoenix 2009  
Introduction 
Contemporary negotiation research advocates the notion of “win-win”, in that it is always possible to “expand the 
pie” (Fisher and Ury 1981) to reach an “integrative” solution (Walton and McKersie 1965) or to arrive at a mutually 
beneficial agreement that maximizes settlement efficiency and fairness under appropriate conditions (Nash 1950; 
1953; Raiffa 1982). Nevertheless, it is often difficult for human negotiators to identify and make tradeoffs necessary 
to reach optimum outcomes due to their limited information processing capacity and capability, cognitive biases, as 
well as socio-emotional obstacles (Foroughi 1995; Jelasi and Foroughi 1989; Neale and Bazerman 1991; Thompson 
and Hrebec 1996). The main purpose of designing Negotiation Support Systems (NSSs) is to facilitate human 
negotiators to reach better outcomes using decision and communication support tools (Bui 1994; Delaney et al. 
1997; Kersten and Noronha 1999; Lim and Benbast 1993; Rangaswamy and Shell 1997; Shakun 1991).  
Due to the rapid growth of global e-markets, there has been a significant interest in developing autonomous software 
agents that can serve as surrogates for human business decision-makers. In automated negotiation, software agents 
prepare and find contracts autonomously on behalf of the real-world parties they represent (Beam and Segev 1997; 
Lomuscio et al. 2003; Jennings et al. 2001). Agents offer a number of potential benefits to e-markets (Starke and 
Rangaswamy 2000). First of all, software agents decrease the transaction costs associated with human operation. 
Second, software agents can increase the efficiency of settlements even for semi-structured, multi-issue business 
bargaining problems (Oliver 1997). As compared to human agents who may deviate from their planned behavior, 
software agents stay aligned with the behavior patterns set by their human principals and are more rationally 
persistent with their aspirations. Third, agents can minimize some of the negative aspects of human negotiations, 
e.g., they can help individuals, who are uncomfortable with “haggling”, avoid face-to-face encounters. Altogether, 
software negotiation agents offer new commercial possibilities by turning conventional multi-issue online business 
transactions into negotiation-based transactions (Oliver 1997).  
The negotiation strategy adopted by a negotiator is a key determinant to the outcome of negotiation. It is particularly 
important when one party is a software agent and the other party is assumed by a human (hereafter, we use the term 
“agent” to refer to a software agent in an agent-to-human multi-issue negotiation). A poorly designed agent will not 
be able to effectively deal with a skillful human counterpart adopting flexible strategies. Because external factors 
such as negotiation issues, rules, and environment are often predetermined (Neal and Bazerman 1992), in automated 
negotiation, a negotiation strategy corresponds to the private decision-making function set up for the agent to 
accomplish its goals. The primary challenge in formalizing a practical negotiation strategy is that an agent has only 
incomplete information about the counterpart, such as the counterpart’s utility function, resistance utility and 
deadlines. For example, in simple price bargaining, if the agent is overly tough, it may lose the chance to clinch a 
deal with its opponent; on the other hand, if it is too soft or accommodative, it would probably just earn marginal 
profits on the agreement. Another challenge arises from the potential tradeoffs in the presence of multiple issues 
(Fatima et al. 2004). If an agent does not recognize the preferences of the counterpart, the agent may fail to make 
tradeoffs for better outcomes even if they exist. Techniques such as rule-based concession (Matwin et al. 1991), 
case-based reasoning (Sycara 1990), machine learning with genetic algorithms (Oliver 1997) and Bayesian models 
(Zeng and Sycara 1998), and tradeoff mechanisms with estimation techniques (Coehoorn and Jennings 2004; Faratin 
et al. 2002; Jonker et al. 2007) partially address these challenges in developing agent-based negotiation strategies. 
Despite such endeavors, the extant designs of software agents are still limited in the following ways. First, many 
negotiation strategies focus on the “distributive”, win-lose mode of negotiation (Walton and McKersie 1965), such 
as pushing the offers as near to the counterpart’s resistance price as possible (Zeng and Sycara 1998). Their 
effectiveness is only illustrated in single-issue negotiations (e.g., Faratin et al. 1998) and can be ineffective and 
inefficient in multi-issue negotiations (Lee and Chang 2008). Second, existing research tends to focus on a single 
dimension of a strategy in negotiations. That is, the issue of how to make offers (e.g., Faratin et al. 1998; 2002; 
Jonker et al. 2007; Zeng and Sycara 1998) and the issue of how to respond to counteroffers (e.g., Oliver 1997) are 
often studied separately. A well-designed strategy for an agent should be able to cover both. We are not aware of 
any previous design that integrates the two dimensions of strategy to form a comprehensive strategy. Third, 
empirical examinations on the effectiveness of existing agent strategies are mostly performed in agent-agent 
simulations, but not in agent-to-human negotiations. Therefore, a deeper understanding of the effect of agent 
negotiation strategies on a human counterpart’s perception is lacking.  
In this paper, we propose a negotiation strategy model for a software agent in agent-to-human multi-issue 
negotiation. Our model strives to foster win-win negotiations and consists of two strategy dimensions: it makes 
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simultaneous-equivalent offers rather than sequential-single offers and it employs delayed acceptance rather than 
immediate acceptance of a counteroffer that meets the agent’s bottom-line. Two research questions are examined: 
1) Will simultaneous-equivalent offers and delayed acceptance enhance the negotiation outcome?  
2) How do the two strategy dimensions affect the human counterparts’ subjective evaluations of the negotiation? 
We implement the strategies as decision algorithms programmed in an agent. This allows us to empirically evaluate 
both the economic, utility-based outcomes of different negotiation strategies as well as their social-psychological 
effects. Furthermore, we test the agent in a B2B electronic marketplace scenario to demonstrate their potential 
applicability in online business. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents important concepts underlying the notion of win-win 
negotiation, and discusses related research in the automated negotiation literature. We then propose the design of our 
strategy based on insights from psychological and behavioral research on negotiation. We next describe a 2x2 
experiment on multi-issue negotiations between a software agent (as seller) and a human subject (as buyer). Finally 
we report on the analysis of experimental data and implications. 
Theoretical Development  
The fundamental reason to negotiate is to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement in the presence of different 
goals or expectations from negotiating parties. In negotiation literature, a negotiator’s expectation is often known as 
the negotiator’s aspiration. Aspiration is used either to refer to the best settlement point that one can achieve (Yukl 
1974), the zero profit point (Chertkoff and Esser 1976), or a region between the best hoped-for outcome and a worst 
resistance point (Lewicki et al. 2006, p. 120; Oliver et al. 1994; Walton and McKersie 1965; White and Neale 1991). 
In this study, we adopt the region-based concept of aspiration, with the upper bound defined as a target utility, 
referring to the point where a negotiator feels satisfied to conclude the negotiation. The lower bound of the 
aspiration region is defined by a reservation utility, or resistance utility, a subjective threshold that can be matched 
with a negotiator’s objective bottom-line situation. The objective bottom-line situation is also known as one’s best 
alternative to a negotiated settlement (BATNA) (Fisher and Ury 1981; Raffia 1982). An initial utility, such as the 
asking price, is the utility point matching the very first offer (Lewicki et al. 2006, p. 120) 
A negotiation can be associated with a single issue or with multiple issues (Raiffa 1982). A single-issue negotiation 
is often a zero-sum or distributive game with only one winner (Walton and McKersie 1965). Negotiators often 
employ distributive strategies such as pushing for a settlement close the counterpart’s resistance point, thereby 
“claiming” the largest part of the settlement. In multi-issue negotiations (e.g., when negotiating purchase quantity, 
unit price, delivery time, warranty, and payment terms together), the negotiation situation is often non-zero-sum or 
integrative (Walton and McKersie 1965) in that there can be more than one way for negotiators to achieve their 
goals. As there are more dimensions in the solution, there are additional opportunities for parties to tradeoff their 
different interests over the issues, and hence achieve better outcomes (Fisher and Ury 1981; Raiffa 1982).  
Economic View on Negotiation  
Negotiation outcomes can be divided into two broad groupings: economic outcomes and social-psychological 
outcomes (Thompson 1990). The economic perspective primarily assesses negotiation outcome based on the 
efficiency and fairness of the allocation of resources in a negotiated settlement. Settlement efficiency reflects how 
“optimal” the settlement is for negotiation parties. Individual efficiency reflects the extent to which individual 
utility payoffs approach the maximum value. At the dyadic level, joint efficiency reflects the extent to which a 
dyad’s joint payoffs approach a frontier. The basic theory underlying the optimization of negotiation outcomes is 
best known with the notion of Pareto efficiency. A Pareto-efficient agreement is one where no other agreement 
results in both parties being jointly better off. A Pareto-efficient frontier refers to the set of Pareto-optimal 
agreements, i.e., the locus of achievable joint evaluations beyond which no additional joint gains are possible (Raiffa 
1982). In experimental negotiation literature, joint efficiency (often referred to as joint utility) can be measured by 
summing up individual utility scores or by calculating the distance from the settlement point to the Pareto-efficient 
frontier (i.e., distance to Pareto-efficient frontier) (Tripp and Sondak 1992).  
Fairness or equality connotes the second aspect of settlement quality. Settlement fairness reflects how “fair” the 
settlement is with regard to principles such as equality, equity, justice and needs. Nash (1950, 1953) integrated the 
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Pareto standard with a set of fairness principles to define what came to be known as the Nash bargaining solution. 
The Nash bargaining theory strives to maximize the joint efficiency of two negotiation parties while maintaining 
fairness. Nash imposes three axioms: independence of irrelevant alternatives, efficiency, and symmetry. The Nash 
solution or Nash equilibrium is a single point that satisfies Pareto efficiency and fairness given the three axioms. 
Simply, this solution is a fair settlement that maximizes joint efficiency. Therefore, the fairness of a settlement can 
be measured by the distance between the settlement and the Nash solution (i.e., distance to Nash solution) (e.g., Lim 
and Benbasat 1993; Goh et al. 2000). The smaller the distance is, the better the settlement fairness is. Figure 1 
illustrates these concepts. 
 
Figure 1.  Buyer-Seller Utility Graph in Multi-Issue Negotiations 
Because communication invokes a cost itself, the process efficiency is another realistic consideration in 
negotiations. As the complexity of a negotiation task increases, negotiation often becomes a prolonged process. 
Generally speaking, other outcomes being equal, it is more desirable to shorten the time to reach an agreement. The 
time to settlement can be measured by the time taken from the beginning of the negotiation to the point when an 
agreement is reached. The number of rounds to settlement is another measure of process efficiency. 
Not all negotiations lead to mutual agreements. The quality of a negotiation can be indicated by whether an 
agreement is reached, assuming that a zone of agreement (see Figure 1) exists. It can be measured by an impasse 
ratio or inversely, a settlement ratio, the ratio of unsettled or settled cases over all negotiation cases (Tripp and 
Sondak 1992). The lower the impasse ratio is, or the higher the settlement ratio, the better the process efficiency is.  
Social-psychological View on Negotiation 
Satisfaction with the settlement is conceivably the most important subjective outcome used in empirical 
negotiation support systems research (e.g., Delaney et al. 1997; Eliashberg et al. 1992; Foroughi et al. 1995; Lim 
and Yang 2007; Oliver et al. 1994; Perkins et al. 1996; Rangaswamy and Shell 1997). Satisfaction with the outcome 
reflects the subjective belief that a negotiator has achieved efficient and fair solutions (Lim and Benbasat 1993). 
Perception of the counterpart, or perception of the other party (Thompson 1990), refers to a negotiator’s judgment 
of his/her counterpart that is associated with a general social-psychological concept of person perception, such as 
trait inference (e.g., intelligence, sociability, expertise, cooperativeness, friendliness), or attributions that negotiators 
make to explain the behavior of the opponent (e.g., ethics, tactics, and strategies) (Morris et al. 1999; Tinsley et al. 
2002). In this study, perception of the counterpart refers to the perceived cooperativeness of the counterpart. 
Research has suggested that a negotiator’s subjective evaluations of the negotiation outcome are predictive of his/her 
desire for future relationships (Oliver et al. 1994). This can be attributed to the fact that in most real-life 
negotiations, negotiators can not directly evaluate the objective utility achieved by their counterparts and the fairness 
of the settlement; therefore, they judge the negotiation outcome based on subjective evaluations of the opponent’s 
behavior such as concession patterns and other social cues.  
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Summarizing the above, from an individual negotiator’s perspective, the most desirable negotiation outcome is 
achieved when the settlement is economically efficient and fair, and at the same time the counterpart is happy about 
the settlement as well as the interaction with the negotiator. In order to achieve a desirable negotiation outcome, 
various negotiation strategies have been devised. The following section reviews the existing automated negotiation 
literature addressing the strategy issue and its impact on related aspects of negotiation outcome. 
Related Work on Strategies for Agent-Based Negotiation 
Research in designing practical agent-based negotiation strategies can be grouped into three non-exclusive 
approaches: heuristics, machine learning, and argumentation. Heuristic methods are proposed to overcome 
limitations of game-theoretic approaches (Nash 1950; 1953) which assume perfect information and rationality that 
are rarely applicable to real-life negotiations (Raiffa 1982). A heuristics approach acknowledges that an agent’s 
utility function is usually private and there is a cost associated with computation and decision making. Therefore 
agents search the zone of agreement in a non-exhaustive fashion (Jennings et al. 2001). Earlier research (Faratin et 
al. 1998) categorizes an agent’s decision functions in time-dependent, resource-dependent, and behavior-dependent 
manners. For each negotiation issue, the next offer is calculated as a simple function of time, resource, or 
counterpart behaviors. A multi-issue negotiation strategy (in deciding the next offer) is subsequently modeled as a 
“weighted combination” of these single-issue functions/tactics (Faratin et al. 1998, p. 166). Nevertheless, this 
method looks at issues separately, and ignores the opportunity for tradeoff among multiple issues to achieve more 
win-win solutions (Lee and Chang 2008). In order to address this limitation, an extended strategy applies fuzzy logic 
to allow a negotiation agent to approximate the opponent’s preference structure, and thus make tradeoffs in its offers 
based on the similarity to the opponent’s last offers (Faratin et al. 2002). Simulation results show that such tradeoffs 
can lead to higher joint gains for the agents. However, empirical studies confirming the efficacy of such agents in 
agent-to-human contexts are lacking. There is a need for more “extensive evaluation” (Jennings et al. 2001, p. 210). 
The machine learning approach to automated negotiation focuses on the design of guessing heuristics, i.e., an 
agent’s methods to learn about its counterpart (e.g., opponent’s resistance point) and external world (e.g., interest 
rate) to adjust its negotiation strategy. For example, earlier research has studied the use of genetic algorithms to find 
the best offer strategy (Oliver 1997). Another study presents a modeling framework pertaining to an agent’s belief 
about the environment and information about the opponent(s) (Zeng and Sycara 1998). This information is updated 
using Bayesian rules. The agent “always chooses the action that maximizes the expected payoff given the 
information available at this stage” (Zeng and Sycara 1998, p. 131). The essence of such approach is to guess the 
counterpart’s resistance point and push the agent’s next offer closer to it, underlining the “distributive” mode of 
negotiation (Walton and McKersie 1965). Later studies examine more sophisticated learning mechanisms for multi-
issue negotiations. For example, research indicates that “kernel density estimation” (Coehoorn and Jennings 2004) 
or partial ordering of attribute weights (Jonker et al. 2007), as an alternative to fuzzy logic (Faratin et al. 2002), can 
also be used to learn about opponent’s preferences, such that the next “tradeoff” offer can be composed based on the 
estimated opponent’s utility function and one’s own utility function. However, the estimation of opponent’s 
preference structure generally requires a large number of prior negotiation trials or an initially-default-later-update 
process, before an agent can learn a good negotiation strategy. Such conditions are not easily met in the real-world. 
It is also observed that existing approaches extensively focus on examining the strategy dimension of offer-making. 
The third category of agent-based automated negotiation research, the argumentation approach, focuses on how to 
make offers more attractive by allowing additional information to be exchanged (Huang et al. 2006; Kraus et al. 
1998; Parsons et al. 1998). The additional information can be in the form of a message that accompanies an offer to 
justify why the offer is composed in that particular way; or to give criticism of a counteroffer. In this paper, we do 
not manipulate the argumentation aspect, and adopt a negotiation protocol of pure offer and counteroffer exchanges.  
A Strategy Model for Win-Win Negotiation 
Our proposed negotiation strategy focuses on the fundamental aspects/dimensions of communication in negotiation 
(Tutzauer 1992), i.e., making offers and reacting to counteroffers. Specifically, an offer strategy is a plan associated 
with a negotiator’s decisions in making offers, and an acceptance strategy is a plan associated with reactions to a 
counteroffer. The two strategy dimensions coordinate with each other and form a comprehensive strategy model. 
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This model has the following assumptions and boundaries. First, it assumes that the negotiation agent has full 
knowledge about itself. That is, the agent is preloaded with the private task information including the utility 
function, aspiration levels, and deadline, as well as the public task information of the issues to be negotiated. This 
model does not consider the situation where issues can be restructured or manipulated (Kersten et al. 1991; Sycara 
1991) for strategic advantage during the actual negotiation process. Second, the model assumes that the agent has 
limited knowledge about its counterpart. It does not presuppose the agent has knowledge of its counterpart’s 
preference structure, aspiration levels, or deadlines a priori. Third, the model assumes that all parties comply with a 
simple set of negotiation rules, based on the bilateral alternate offer protocol (Rubinstein 1982). Parties take 
alternate turns to make offers and counteroffers without argumentation. Negotiation terminates if one party accepts 
the other’s offer at a certain round, or rejects an offer labeled as “final” by the proposing party. The negotiation rules 
are public information. 
Our strategy strives to accomplish a win-win outcome defined by both economic and social-psychological outcomes 
(Fisher and Ury 1981; Raiffa 1982; Thompson 1990; 2009). The success of an agent’s strategy is explicitly assessed 
by the utility payoffs as well as the counterpart’s subjective reactions. Figure 2 presents the research model. 
 
Figure 2. The Research Model 
Offer Strategy  
Regarding making offers, an intuitive strategy is to start with a tough offer and to make monotone concessions from 
it (Raiffa 1982, p. 128). In experimental psychology, it is well indicated that negotiators who make tough opening 
offers get higher settlements than do those who make low or modest opening offers (Chertkoff and Conley 1967; 
Cohen 2003; Pruitt and Syna 1985; Weingart et al. 1990). However, a tough opening offer may be harmful to long-
term relationships as it communicates high self-concern and an attitude of hardiness; conversely, however, if an 
offer is too soft and accommodative, the negotiator sacrifices his/her own substantive payoffs (Pruitt and Rubin 
1986). A sequential-single offer strategy is an offer strategy when a negotiator adopts a concession-based approach 
by starting with a tough offer, and concedes by making offers of a lower self-utility sequentially in subsequent 
rounds. An alternative to this basic offer strategy is the use of simultaneous-equivalent offers recently proposed in 
social psychology (Leonardelli et al. 2008; Medvec et al. 2005a; 2005b; Thompson 2009, p. 86). This method 
involves presenting the other party with at least two offers of equal value to oneself at each round.  
From an economic perspective, the merits associated with simultaneous-equivalent offer strategy are twofold. First, 
in a multi-issue negotiation, the possibility to make tradeoffs among issues allows the construction of alternatives 
that are of equivalent (or at least comparable) utility to the offering party. This mechanism does not harm the 
negotiator’s own substantive payoffs. Second, when the alternatives are offered simultaneously, the counterpart can 
evaluate them based on his/her private utility function/preference structure, although unknown to the proposing 
party. Therefore, the counterpart’s utility corresponding to a negotiation settlement can be potentially improved, and 
consequently, the overall settlement efficiency is increased.  
By making simultaneous-equivalent offers, the agent also increases the chances that one of the offers will appeal to 
the counterpart by matching his/her target point. In an open, e-market environment where an agent can encounter a 
diversity of potential buyers, simultaneous offers can increase the likelihood of acceptance. In human-to-human 
negotiation experiments, this method has been shown to lead to better acceptance rate as well as the opponent’s 
satisfaction towards the offers (Leonardelli et al. 2008; Medvec et al. 2005a). 
Negotiation Strategy  
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H1. Compared to the sequential-single offer strategy, the individual efficiency of the counterpart will be improved 
(e.g., buyer utility is higher) when the agent makes simultaneous-equivalent offers.  
H2. Compared to the sequential-single offer strategy, the joint efficiency will be improved (e.g., joint utility is 
higher, or distance to Pareto-efficient frontier is smaller) when the agent makes simultaneous-equivalent offers.  
H3. Compared to the sequential-single offer strategy, the settlement ratio will be higher when the agent makes 
simultaneous-equivalent offers. 
Satisfaction with negotiation outcome is conceptualized as a two-dimensional construct (Lim and Benbasat 1993): 
perceived settlement efficiency that corresponds to a negotiator’s confidence with solution, and perceived settlement 
fairness corresponding to a negotiator’s evaluation of his/her outcome in comparison with the opponent. Because 
simultaneous-equivalent offers are expected to lead to a higher utility to the other party, the other party will feel 
better about the outcome. Furthermore, simultaneous offers can create a contrast effect (Simonson and Tversky 
1992) in that an offer is viewed more favorably in the presence of other (poorer) choices than when it is presented by 
itself. Therefore, if the counterpart accepts an offer among simultaneous offers, s/he is likely to feel more satisfied.   
H4. Compared to the sequential-single offer strategy, counterparts will have a greater satisfaction with the 
outcome when the agent makes simultaneous-equivalent offers.  
An important psychological outcome in negotiation is a negotiator’s judgment on the faithfulness, friendliness, and 
flexibility of the counterpart (Curhan et al. 1996; Thompson 1990). This is defined as the perceived cooperativeness 
in our model. Past research uses similar notions such as perceived collaborative/negative climate (Foroughi et al. 
1995), satisfaction with the general atmosphere (Eliashberg et al. 1992), or satisfaction with the partner (Kwon and 
Wingart 2004) to describe the subjective feelings related to the negotiation partner. One of the basic signs of 
cooperativeness is to give choices, rather than demanding an unfriendly yes-or-no answer to a single choice. The 
presentation of multiple choices in a simultaneous-equivalent strategy serves as a social cue (Fiske and Taylor 1991) 
to communicate an apparent signal of flexibility and commitment in reaching agreement. Therefore, the counterpart 
is likely to perceive a higher degree of cooperativeness on part of the agent. 
H5. Compared to the sequential-single offer strategy, counterparts have a higher perceived cooperativeness 
towards the agent when the agent makes simultaneous-equivalent offers. 
Acceptance Strategy 
The acceptance strategy deals with how to react to an offer from the counterpart. A straightforward acceptance 
strategy is the “threshold decision rule” (Oliver 1997) by making an immediate acceptance of an offer that exceeds 
the bottom-line utility. In a multi-issue negotiation, however, the negotiating parties’ preferences may not all be in 
conflict with each another. Thus, even when an offer meets an agent’s reservation point, there could still be solutions 
that are better for both parties. An agent could explore better offers without sacrificing the counterpart’s utility.  
In contrast to the immediate acceptance strategy, the delayed acceptance strategy is a method to further explore 
offers although the counterpart’s offer has met the agent’s reservation utility. As a quick recap, we have defined two 
aspiration levels for strategic decision making. First, the method specifies a reservation utility of the agent, which 
refers to the subjective resistance point matching an objective bottom-line based on its BATNA (Fisher and Ury 
1981; Raffia 1982). Second, the agent maintains a target utility where the negotiator is satisfied to conclude a 
negotiation, which usually has “a reasonable distance from the bottom-line” (Raffia 1982, p. 127). The region set by 
the reservation utility and the target utility determines the region in which a negotiator is willing to explore offers. 
With this strategy, an agent first initializes the reservation utility to be equal to its BATNA utility. As negotiation 
proceeds, in case the agent receives an offer which exceeds its reservation utility (but not the target utility), the agent 
dynamically adjusts its reservation utility to match the utility to the offer, and continues negotiating for better 
agreements. This allows the agent to avoid a “premature closure” (Kelly 1966) by increasing its chances of getting a 
better deal. Consequently, the joint efficiency will also be increased.   
Undoubtedly, delaying in accepting an offer still involves a risk of not being able to get better offers in later rounds. 
To minimize this risk, besides dynamically updating the agent’s reservation utility to match the best offer from its 
counterpart, the method allows the agent to re-calculate/shorten the remaining negotiation rounds depending on the 
relative attractiveness of the counterpart’s offer. This allows the agent to avoid being overly “greedy” in exploring 
better offers. Thus, 
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H6. Compared to the immediate acceptance strategy, the individual efficiency of the agent is higher when the agent 
adopts a delayed acceptance strategy.  
H7. Compared to the immediate acceptance strategy, the joint efficiency is higher when the agent adopts a delayed 
acceptance strategy. 
A negotiator often experiences a counterfactual thinking when his/her proposal is accepted by the counterpart 
quickly: “I must have asked for too little. The counterpart is taking advantage from me” (Bazerman 1983). The 
negotiator may suspect that the other party knows too much or has insight into an unseen advantage. In cognitive 
negotiation theories, such a regrettable state of affairs is often described as the winner’s curse, which refers to the 
tendency of negotiators, particularly in an auction setting, to settle too quickly on an item and then subsequently feel 
a discomfort about an agreement that comes too easily (Ball et al. 1991; Bazerman and Samuelson 1983; Neale and 
Bazerman 1991). Recent research suggests that the counterfactual thinking makes a negotiator feels less satisfied 
when having one’s first offer accepted (Galinsky et al. 2002). By delaying an acceptance decision, the agent can 
continue negotiating by invoking its offer strategy, making chances for the settlement to be reached through 
progressive concession. Past studies indicate that parties feel better about a settlement when the negotiation involves 
a progression of concessions than when it didn’t (Baranowski and Summers 1972; Deutsch 1958). Therefore, 
H8. Compared to the immediately acceptance strategy, the counterpart’s satisfaction with the outcome will be 
higher when the agent adopts a delayed acceptance strategy. 
Desire for Future Negotiation 
The willingness to negotiate in the future is a critical factor in dyadic contexts such as buyer-supplier relationships. 
In an earlier experimental study (Oliver et al. 1994), negotiators’ desire for future interaction with their partners is 
shown to be significantly correlated with satisfaction with the current negotiation outcome. The relationship works 
from two possible routes (Oliver et al. 1994). Satisfaction may influence future negotiation behavior through the 
cognitive mediator of interpersonal trust (Kumar 1989). Alternatively, as satisfaction is raised from favorable 
outcomes, it engenders confidence in this particular counterpart and hence instrumental motivation (Vroom 1964). 
We therefore predict that a positive evaluation of the negotiation outcome and the counterpart will lead to one’s 
desire to continue with future relationships. 
H9. The counterpart’s satisfaction with the outcome and perceived cooperativeness of the agent is positively 
associated with a desire for future negotiation. 
Experiment Design 
A 2x2 experimental study was designed to test the hypotheses. The subjects were tasked to play the role of a buyer 
negotiating a purchase with a supplier over the supplier’s portal website. The supplier (seller) was assumed by an 
automated software agent, but subjects were not told that the seller was played by a software agent. Figure 3 shows 
the screen used in the experiment.  
Before the main experiment, we conducted a pilot study involving 20 participants who were business executives and 
researchers. The participants were invited to go through the experiment as subjects and to criticize the experiment 
instrument and procedure. Experimental procedure was smoothened, and questionnaire items were polished based 
on their feedback. Subjects for the main experiment were working professionals with experience in organizations 
and decision making. In total, 110 subjects were recruited from an international business park with diverse 
backgrounds including retailing, manufacturing, media and services, IT, and R&D. Their average age was 30.5 with 
55.5% males. All subjects had at least one year of working experience, and the majority (61.5%) had worked for 2-
10 years. All subjects had experience with group work. On average, the subjects had high computer efficacy (4.35 
out of 5-point Likert scale); and had been moderately exposed to online shopping (3.25 out of 5), business decisions 
(2.80 out of 5) and business negotiation activities (2.42 out of 5).  
As an incentive for active participation in the experiment, subjects received tiered cash rewards based on their 
negotiation performance. The performance was measured by the individual utility earned by the subject on the 
negotiated agreement, with higher cash rewards given to subjects achieving higher individual utility scores. Each 
subject received $20 for their participation. Additionally, the top 10%, the second 10%, and the third 10% out of all 
subjects received $50, $30, and $20 cash respectively. The top winner also received a PDA phone worth $750. 
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Figure 3. Sample Interface for the Agent-to-human Negotiation 
Experiment Task 
This experiment involved a negotiation task about online purchase of laptop computers with four issues comprising 
unit price, quantity, service level, and delivery terms. The task was adapted from a validated negotiation scenario 
based on real-world manufacturing contract negotiations (originally developed by Jones 1988; and used in 
experimental negotiation studies including Delaney et al. 1997; Foroughi et al. 1995; Goh et al. 2000). In the task, 
subjects (buyers) and agents (sellers) both used private utility functions which were a weighted sum of the utilities 
assigned to the four issues. However, buyers and sellers had different weightings such that their interests were not in 
direct conflict with each another. In game-theoretic terms, the structure of the task created a non-zero-sum game 
with 728 discrete alternatives, where integrative, win-win solutions were possible. Both the buyer and the seller 
were given the same bargaining power, i.e., BATNA values that represented 44 utility points. 
Independent Variables and Control Variables 
A 2x2 between-subject factorial experiment design was employed to test our hypotheses. Two independent 
variables, the offer strategy and the acceptance strategy of the seller, were manipulated using a decision algorithm 
coded into a web-based negotiation agent system (refer to Yang and Singhal 2009 for a more detailed discussion of 
the system design framework). The subjects were randomly assigned to negotiate with an agent configured under the 
four treatment conditions. Figure 4 depicts the design. In each cell, the first number indicates negotiation cases and 
the number in bracket refers to the number of cases where agreements were reached. 
 
  Offer Strategy 
  SEQ (sequential-   
single offer) 
SIM (simultaneous-
equivalent offer) 
IMM (immediate 
 acceptance) 28 (21) subjects 26 (21) subjects 
 
Acceptance 
Strategy DLY (delayed 
 acceptance) 27 (20) subjects 29 (22) subjects 
Figure 4. Experimental Design  
We formalized the simultaneous-equivalent offer strategy (SIM condition) with the following decision algorithm. 
To start off, the agent’s initial offer utility (Uoffer) is set at 80 (Uinitial). a) To generate the four offers with Uoffer, the 
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agent searches the zone of agreement for offer alternatives and selects a subset of the alternatives with their 
corresponding utility values equal to or greater than Uoffer, then further selects four of them as offers with each offer 
optimizing one of the four negotiation issues to the buyer. The agent then presents these four simultaneous-
equivalent offers (Figure 5) to the buyer and invites a response (accept, or reject with counteroffer). b-1) If the buyer 
accepts any of the offers, the negotiation episode is concluded; b-2) Else if the buyer proposes a counteroffer, the 
agent invokes the acceptance strategy. c-1) If the acceptance strategy returns “accept”, the agent accepts the 
counteroffer and the negotiation episode is concluded; c-2) Else if the acceptance strategy returns “offer”, the agent 
makes a monotone decreasing concession (i.e., update Uoffer by reducing Uoffer monotonically; Yang and Singhal 
2009) and returns to step a. d) If the planned number of rounds (R is initialized as 9) has been reached, and the agent 
makes a final set of offers matching Ureservation for the buyer to decide (accept, or reject with final counteroffer). As a 
comparison, sequential-single offer strategy (SEQ condition), used as the baseline offer strategy, differs from SIM 
only in that the agent randomly picks one of the offers generated in step a for presentation to the buyer. 
The delayed acceptance strategy (DLY condition) applies the following decision algorithm. Upon receiving a 
counteroffer at round i, the agent evaluates it using its own utility function and adjusts its private decision 
parameters using the following rules. 1) If the counteroffer is marked “final” and the counteroffer utility (Ui) is 
above the BATNA utility (UBATNA), return “accept”; 2) Else if Ui is above the target utility (Utarget is set at 60) (i.e., 
the counteroffer falls in the Acceptance Region in Figure 5), return “accept”; 3) Else if Ui is less than Utarget but 
above the current reservation utility (Ureservation is initialized as UBATNA ; where UBATNA is set at 44) (i.e., the 
counteroffer falls in the Aspiration Region in Figure 5), set Ureservation = Ui, and re-adjust the total planned concession 
rounds to be R*(Ui – Ureservation)/( Uinitial – UBATNA) and returns “offer”; 4) Else if Ui is less than Ureservation (i.e., the 
counteroffer falls in the Rejection Region in Figure 5), 
 
returns “offer”. As a comparison, in the baseline acceptance 
strategy immediate acceptance situation (IMM condition), the agent simply returns “accept” if the utility computed 
from the counteroffer is greater than UBATNA, else it returns “offer”. 
  
Figure 5.  An Illustration of the Agent’s Strategy in the Experiment Task 
Other pertinent factors were controlled in the experiment. The negotiation rules were controlled by using the same 
alternate offer protocol for all conditions and allowing both parties to indicate a final offer at any time. The same 
negotiation task was used in all conditions. The effects of individual differences (e.g., age, gender, past experience, 
personality) of buyers and their target utility values were randomized as a result of random assignment of subjects to 
the different treatment conditions. The target utility of sellers was kept constant as specified in the agents’ decision 
algorithm across all treatments. The negotiation website interface was controlled. The effect of physical environment 
was controlled by using the same training room throughout all sessions. The experimenter effects were controlled by 
using the same facilitator with a standardized instruction script across all sessions. 
UBATNA  
Utarget  
Ureservation  
Uinitial  
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Dependent Variables  
Individual utility was calculated as the weighted sum of utility scores from the issues based on the multi-attribute 
utility model (Keeney and Raiffa 1991; Raiffa et al. 2002). Suppose the negotiating parties, A and B, have reached 
an agreement on three issues, X, Y and Z. Based on the agreement and A’s private utility function, A derives the 
following utilities, or weightage points: Uxa for X, Uya for Y, and Uza for Z. Similarly, B derives Uxb for X, Uyb for 
Y, and Uzb for Z. The individual efficiency of A (Ua) and B (Ub) were calculated as (Uxa + Uya + Uza) and (Uxb + Uyb 
+ Uzb) respectively.  
The joint efficiency was measured in two ways: the distance to Pareto-efficient frontier as well as the distance to 
Nash solution. The smaller the distances are, the better the settlement efficiency is. Mathematically, distance to 
Pareto-efficient frontier is calculated as                                                                ,   where Uai, Ubi denote A’s and B’s  
utilities corresponding to an efficient solution i. Here i is a sequential index of efficient solutions, and n is the total 
number of efficient solutions. 
Distance to Nash solution was calculated as                                                    , where Ua_nash, Ub_nash denote A’s and 
B’s utilities corresponding to the Nash solution. 
Settlement ratio was calculated as the ratio of the number of settlements over the total number of negotiation cases 
(i.e., sample size in each condition). Process efficiency was measured in both the settlement time (in minutes) and 
settlement rounds from the beginning of the negotiation to the point when an agreement was made.  
The social-psychological perspective of negotiation outcomes were evaluated using a post-negotiation questionnaire 
(Table 1). Items were adapted from previous studies whenever possible (Curhan et al. 2006; Eliashberg et al. 1992; 
Foroughi et al. 1995; Rangaswamy and Shell 1997; Oliver et al. 1994). Otherwise, new instruments were developed. 
Table 1. Measurement of Subjective Negotiation Outcome 
Dependent Variables Items Scale 
How satisfied are you with the utility 
score you earned? 
1-Extremely dissatisfied; 4-Indifferent; 7-
Extremely satisfied 
How satisfied are you with the values of 
the agreement?  
1-Extremely dissatisfied; 4-Indifferent; 7-
Extremely satisfied 
What do you think of the agreement? 1-Much worse than expected; 4-As 
expected; 7-Much better than expected 
 
 
 
Perceived 
Settlement 
Efficiency 
What do you think of the relative ranking 
of your utility score among all buyers? 
1-I’m much lower than average; 4-I’m 
average; 7-I’m much higher than average  
To what extent do you think the 
agreement was of equal utility value to 
you and the seller?  
-5-The seller earns much higher utility 
score than me; 0-We obtained same utility 
scores; 5-I earn much higher utility score 
than the seller 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Satisfaction 
with the 
Outcome   
 
Perceived 
Settlement 
Fairness Do you think the final agreement is fair? -5-The agreement is extremely biased 
towards the seller; 0-The agreement is 
fair; 5- The agreement is extremely biased 
towards me 
Do you think the seller was considerate 
about your interests and concerns? 
1-Extremely inconsiderate; 4-Moderately;  
7- Extremely considerate 
Do you think the seller was rigid in 
making offers to you? (R) 
1-Extremely flexible; 4-Moderately;  7- 
Extremely rigid 
Do you think the seller was friendly? 1-Extremely unfriendly; 4-Moderately;  7- 
Extremely friendly 
Do you think the seller was flexible in 
making offers to you? 
1-Extremely rigid; 4-Moderately;  7- 
Extremely flexible 
 
 
 
 
Perceived 
Cooperativeness  
What kind of “overall” impression did 
the seller make on you?  
1-Extremely negative; 4-Neither negative 
nor positive;  7- Extremely positive 
))()((min 22
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n
i
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=
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If there are needs in future, are you 
willing to interact with this seller again? 
1-Not at all; 4-Moderately;  7- Perfectly 
If there are needs in future, are you 
willing to continue a business 
relationship with this seller? 
1-Not at all; 4-Moderately;  7- Perfectly 
 
 
Desire for Future 
Negotiation 
If another seller is available, would you 
be willing to negotiate with this seller in 
future?  
1-No, prefer another; 4-Indifferent;  7- 
Yes, prefer this seller 
Experimental Procedure 
The experiment followed a three-stage procedure. In the pre-negotiation stage, subjects first read general 
instructions and were briefed about the procedure. Subjects were then given a task information sheet which 
described their role as the buyer. Their goal was to maximize their own utility scores over four negotiable issues for 
purchasing an IT product. To achieve the goal, they attempted to reach an agreement with their counterpart. It was 
emphasized that the higher the utility score the subjects achieved, the higher the cash awards they would be able to 
receive. Subjects were asked to take a quiz to make sure that they understood the task. They were also asked to 
record their target utility as the minimum point above which they would be satisfied. After this, the website and the 
negotiation rules (based on bilateral alternate offer protocol and the equal rights for both parties to make a “final” 
offer) were introduced. It was also clarified that an offer expires if it was not accepted at its present round, but the 
rule did not prevent a party from making an offer which was of equivalent value to one made in previous rounds. 
Finally, a pre-negotiation questionnaire was administered to record their past experience.  
The second stage was the actual negotiation stage. Subjects negotiated with the agent until they reached an 
agreement, or until negotiation is terminated with no agreement when one party rejected the other party’s final offer. 
No time limit from the experimenter was imposed for this stage. 
The third stage was the post-negotiation stage. Upon completing the negotiation task, subjects were asked to record 
their agreement. They were then asked to complete a post-negotiation questionnaire whereby their perceptions 
towards the negotiation process and outcome were measured. Demographic information was also collected. The 
subjects were debriefed to keep their experience in this study confidential, and received their basic participation 
rewards. Performance rewards were announced three weeks after the commencement of the study. 
Data Analysis and Discussion of Results 
Construct Validity, Reliability and Control Check  
Before hypothesis testing, we first checked the construct validity of dependent variables (outcome satisfaction, 
perceived cooperativeness, desire for future negotiation). Exploratory factor analysis with VARIMAX rotation 
showed that the (only) reversed item for perceived cooperativeness did not satisfy the convergent criteria; it was 
dropped from subsequent analysis. The remaining items showed satisfactory convergent and discriminant validity 
where the factor loadings for the intended constructs were greater than the desired threshold of 0.5 (Hair et al. 1995). 
Finally, reliability analysis was conducted and the results showed acceptable values on all constructs with a 
Cronbach’s alpha greater than 0.7.  
To examine internal validity, validation tests for controlled variables were performed to examine the effectiveness of 
the random assignment of the 110 subjects to the treatment conditions. Two-way MANOVA tests on subjects’ 
individual differences (i.e., age; gender; year of working experience; past experiences of group work, computer 
usage, online shopping, business decisions and negotiations; personality traits; target utility), and the subjects’ 
perception of the negotiation rules showed no significant differences across treatment conditions. Of the 110 
subjects, 84 subjects reached an agreement with the seller agents as reported in Figure 4. We performed additional 
control checks on this subgroup. The results showed that the online shopping experience, target utility, and gender 
differed across different treatment conditions; hence, subsequent analyses used the three variables as covariates to 
rule out their effects on the dependent variables (Neter et al. 1990).   
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Analysis of Variance Tests and Hypotheses Testing 
The two-way multivariate ANOVA with covariates test (MANCOVA) was used to investigate the effects of the two 
strategy variables. Multivariate ANOVA was used because it can test multiple dependent variables simultaneously 
and protect against the inflation of type I error if the dependent variables are correlated. The Appendix shows the 
descriptive statistics and profile plots of dependent variables across treatment conditions.  
Table 2 summarizes the results of the two-way MANCOVA tests. The results show significant main effects of the 
offer strategy on buyer utility, distance to Pareto-efficient frontier (because using joint utility measure led to the 
same conclusions, we report only the distance to Pareto-efficient frontier for simplicity), satisfaction with the 
outcome, and perceived cooperativeness, as well as the main effects of the acceptance strategy on seller utility and 
distance to Nash solution. Interaction effects of the two variables were all insignificant. The effect of the strategy 
variables on settlement ratio was performed using logistic regression. The results indicated that the settlement ratio 
did not differ significantly. Post-hoc analysis to investigate this result is presented later. 
Table 2. Summary of Two-Way MANCOVA Results (* p<.05, ** p<.01) 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables ηp2 Observed 
Power 
F Main Effects  
Significant? (p) 
Offer 
Strategy 
Buyer Utility  
Seller Utility  
Distance to Pareto-Efficient Frontier  
Distance to Nash Solution 
Satisfaction with Outcome  
- Perceived Settlement Efficiency 
- Perceived Settlement Fairness 
Perceived Cooperativeness  
.176 
.006 
.179 
.024 
 
.132 
.101 
.084 
.978 
.098 
.980 
.274 
 
.918 
.821 
.739 
16.238 
0.422 
16.584 
1.890 
 
11.530 
8.496 
6.936 
YES (.000**) 
NO (.518) 
YES (.000**) 
NO (.173) 
 
YES (.001**) 
YES (.005**) 
YES (.010*) 
Acceptance 
Strategy 
Buyer Utility  
Seller Utility  
Distance to Pareto-Efficient Frontier  
Distance to Nash Solution 
Satisfaction with Outcome  
- Perceived Settlement Efficiency 
- Perceived Settlement Fairness 
.004 
.070 
.031 
.063 
 
.004 
.001 
.086 
.655 
.333 
.608 
 
.085 
.054 
0.318 
5.704 
2.396 
5.119 
 
0.307 
0.038 
NO (.575) 
YES (.019*) 
NO (.126) 
YES (.027*) 
 
NO (.581) 
NO (.846) 
A linear regression was conducted to test the effects of negotiation process and outcome variables on the desire for 
future negotiation. The regression model includes the strategy variables, their interactions, economic and subjective 
measures of negotiation outcome, as well as the control variables. Results indicate that perceived cooperativeness 
was significantly associated with buyers’ intention for future engagement with the agent (β=0.457; p=0.000**).  
Results and Discussions 
MANCOVA results confirmed the effectiveness of simultaneous-equivalent offer strategy on the individual and 
joint efficiency of negotiated agreement (H1 and H2). The buyer utility in the SIM condition (mean=72.3; s.d.=7.4) 
was significantly higher than that in the SEQ condition (mean=65.4; s.d.=7.7). The distance to Pareto-efficient 
frontier in the SIM condition (mean=4.9; s.d.=3.1) was significantly smaller than that in the SEQ condition 
(mean=9.4; s.d.=5.7). The agreements were reached in an average of 6.9 rounds under all conditions and there was 
no significant difference between SIM and SEQ conditions. This indicates that even though the total time to the 
settlement was longer in the SIM condition (mean=18.7 minutes; s.d.=9.4) than in the SEQ condition (mean=13.8 
minutes; s.d.=6.2), it could be attributed to the time subjects spent on evaluating the multiple choices at each round. 
The process in SIM condition was considered efficient from the perspective of the number of rounds to settlement.  
Other than positively enhancing the economic aspects of negotiation outcome, the simultaneous-equivalent offer 
strategy was shown to significantly enhance the subjective outcomes of negotiation. Subjects were more satisfied 
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with the settlement efficiency when the agent adopted a SIM strategy (mean=4.8; s.d.=0.9) than those when agent 
adopted a SEQ strategy (mean=4.2; s.d.=1.1); they felt that the agreement was more favorable towards themselves 
(compared to towards the seller) in the SIM condition (mean=0.7;s.d.=1.5) than in the SEQ condition (mean=-
0.4;s.d.=1.8) (H4). The results also suggest that when the agents made simultaneous-equivalent offers, they were 
perceived more cooperative (mean=4.2; s.d.=1.1) than otherwise (mean=3.7; s.d.=0.9) (H5). Similar effects were 
observed in previous human-to-human negotiation experiments (Medvec et al. 2005a). Our results confirm the 
applicability of this strategy in building computational automated agents. 
Interestingly, contrary to our hypothesis that the simultaneous-equivalent strategy should lead to a higher settlement 
ratio (H3), the data showed no significant difference between SEQ (31 out of 55 cases) and SIM (33 out of 55 cases) 
conditions. Several explanations are plausible. We first ruled out the reason that the agent failed to accept a 
reasonable offer. This is supported by server logs that verified that the agent behaved according to the acceptance 
algorithm.  Second, there can be a chance that buyers in the unsettled cases in the SIM condition overlooked the 
implication of rejecting a final offer. However, this possibility could be ruled out because of the random assignment 
procedure. Third, it was possible that buyers in the SIM condition who were aware of the “final” offer rule yet still 
tried their luck by counter-proposing a very tough (high self-utility) final counteroffer to the seller. According to the 
negotiation rule, the agent would respond with a summary rejection if such a counteroffer was below its BATNA. 
Post-hoc analysis on the buyer’s final-offer utility showed some evidence for this postulation. In face of the last 
chance (“final” offer round), buyers in the SIM condition made much “tougher” offers (mean of the self-
utility=74.6; s.d.=9.6) than buyers in the SEQ condition (mean of self-utility=68.8; s.d.=8.3) at the p=0.002 
significance level. Therefore, it is possible that when agents gave simultaneous offers (that communicated flexibility 
and cooperativeness), it triggered the buyers to aspire for better outcomes by making tougher final counteroffers that 
fell into the agent’s rejection region. That is, the in situ “escalation” of buyers’ target utility might have neutralized 
the effect of the simultaneous-equivalent offer strategy to increase settlement ratio. Future study is needed to 
investigate these two competing effects.  
The post-hoc analysis is in line with some earlier aspiration research in social psychology: if a negotiator 
communicates a tough attitude (giving a tough initial offer and small concessions), the opponent tends to lower 
his/her aspiration level and make a more favorable final offer, albeit with a tough/negative person perception of the 
negotiator (Siegel and Fouraker 1970; Yukl 1974). Conversely, what our findings suggest is that if a negotiator (the 
software agent in our context) communicates a soft and flexible attitude by giving simultaneous offers, the 
counterparts may increase or escalate their aspirations. If this assertion is true, further exploration of the theoretical 
underpinnings of simultaneous-equivalent offer strategy in this direction will be fruitful.  
The results also confirmed the effectiveness of the delayed acceptance strategy on the settlement performance of 
(H6 and H7). The seller utility in the DLY condition (mean=52.8; s.d.=7.2) was significantly higher than that in the 
IMM condition (mean=48.0; s.d.=5.7). The distance to the Nash solution in the DLY condition (mean=15.3; 
s.d.=5.8) was significantly smaller than that in the IMM condition (mean=19.2; s.d.=5.0). Contrary to H8, while the 
delayed acceptance strategy benefited the seller, it did not significantly affect buyers’ satisfaction with the 
negotiation outcome (mean=4.52; s.d.=0.9 in DLY condition vs. mean=4.49; s.d.=1.2 in IMM condition). In the 
experiment, buyers were highly motivated to pursue self-utility; therefore the delayed acceptance had a more salient 
impact in protecting the seller’s utility instead of further enhancing the buyer’s utility. Thus a significant increase of 
buyers’ perception was not demonstrated. Despite this, the delayed acceptance strategy still appeals to the win-win 
principle in that it preserved a negotiator’s payoffs without projecting a negative image on the counterpart.   
The regression results suggest that perceived cooperativeness was the only variable that significantly associated with 
buyers’ desire for future negotiation (H9). Our data confirmed the impact of the negotiators’ perception of 
cooperativeness on their willingness to return to their partners. The results further highlight the significance of a 
negotiation agent’s capability to communicate friendliness and flexibility to the counterpart, which are critical to 
business relationship on top of its firmness in economic benefits. 
Implications 
The findings of this study have implications for negotiation theories, technological advancement, and the practice in 
electronic marketplaces. First, the findings of our research contribute to the understanding of strategies for multi-
issue negotiation. The manipulation of negotiation strategies as formalized decision rules in a software agent 
allowed us to investigate their effects in a highly controlled manner. Conceptually speaking, a good strategy should 
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be effective even with most uncooperative negotiators (Thompson 2009). Our empirical results confirmed that 
economically and socially desirable outcomes can be better achieved by careful planning and initiatives taken by 
one party. The task used in the experiment created a situation in which subjects were motivated to maximize their 
self-utility as long as an agreement could be reached. In such situations, agents with simultaneous-equivalent offers 
still achieved settlements that were more Pareto-efficient while making the buyer happier compared to agents with 
sequential-single offers. The delayed acceptance strategy confirms that agent can explore better outcomes. Our 
empirical results and post-hoc analysis also suggest that there can be intertwining processes undermining the impact 
of simultaneous-equivalent offer on settlement ratio, thus having implications for theoretical refinement. 
Second, on the technological side, the motivation of our strategy model is to foster a win-win negotiation rather than 
a win-lose one. To the field of automated negotiation, our work presents a technically novel design artifact – an 
integrative, win-win-seeking intelligent agent – compared to traditional software agents that are designed in a 
distributive mode and bounded in their interaction to other software agents. Together, the simultaneous-equivalent 
offer and delayed acceptance strategies are shown to be able to provide a new way to explore more Pareto-efficient 
space in bilateral negotiations. As opposed to agent-to-agent simulation, our experimental study provides an 
empirical validation of the usefulness of software agents when negotiating with human counterparts.  
Furthermore, the findings and the negotiation agent artifact can be potentially applied in today’s B2B electronic 
marketplaces, where intelligent agents are increasingly used in semi-structured online business transactions. Our 
win-win negotiation strategy is based on more realistic assumptions of a negotiation setting, and hence can be used 
in open markets where there are many buyers and many sellers, and where knowledge of or prior interaction history 
with the counterpart is not available to the agent.  
Conclusion and Future Research 
This study proposes a novel strategy model for an automated agent to achieve a win-win negotiation outcome. We 
contend that a good negotiation strategy should account for both positive economic and social-psychological 
outcomes. Our experimental study suggests that, overall, without any prior knowledge of the counterpart based on 
extensive earlier interaction, the proposed strategies (simultaneous-equivalent offer and delayed acceptance) are 
effective in achieving win-win outcomes.  
The findings of our present study open several avenues for future research. First of all, the current implementation of 
simultaneous-equivalent offers is used throughout the agent’s planned number of rounds of offer exchange in a 
negotiation episode. In can be foreseen that if the negotiation task is more complex, or negotiation rounds are 
extended, the agent can learn enough information to estimate the opponent’s preference structure. With such 
estimation, the agent may eliminate offers that are less attractive to the opponent in later rounds of a negotiation 
episode to reduce the cognitive load of its human counterpart. The effectiveness of such combined approach with 
both simultaneous-equivalent offers and guessing heuristics can be empirically tested in future research.  
Second, the present study focused on the examination of the key strategic negotiation parameters on “what” offers 
can be proposed. The study did not explore the “how” aspect in offer making, i.e., how to make argumentation to 
enhance the persuasiveness of an offer. According to latest social-psychological analysis (Thompson 2009, p. 89; 
Medvec et al. 2005a), the simultaneous-equivalent offer strategy can help a negotiator to be more persistent and 
persuasive regarding a value of an offer. It would therefore be interesting to integrate argumentation features into the 
current strategy model. Because additional messages justifying an offer make the offer more attractive, it may 
alleviate the negative effect of simultaneous-equivalent offer strategy in “escalating” buyers’ aspiration. 
Consequently, settlement ratio might be enhanced. Future research can be extended to incorporate the role of 
framing as an argumentation technique and its interaction with the strategy used in this study. 
Furthermore, it is of both theoretical and practical interest to test the agent-based automated negotiation artifact in an 
interesting application domain, such as the software-as-a-service online marketplace. The agent approach to 
negotiation differs from traditional negotiation support systems based on the autonomy and flexibility of agent-
based architecture to be offered as a service to human buyers in consumer settings, where fixed pricing is the norm 
at present. Our current system provides an initial step to this application.  
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Appendix.  Descriptive Statistics and Profile Plots of Dependent Variables 
 
A-1. Mean of buyer utility 
 
A-2. Mean of seller utility 
 
 
A-3. Mean of distance to Pareto-efficient frontier 
 
 
A-4. Mean of distance to Nash solution 
 
A-5. Mean of outcome satisfaction  
(Perceived settlement efficiency dimension) 
 
 
A-6. Mean of outcome satisfaction  
(Perceived settlement fairness dimension) 
 
A-7. Mean of perceived cooperativeness 
 
A-8. Mean of desire for future negotiation 
 
